WedgeSecure Agent

Trustworthy Autonomy at the Agentic Edge

An Innovative Microservices Platform To Secure Agentic Workflows.

Hongwen Zhang, PhD

WEDGE NETWORKS

February 17, 2026 Wedge Networks Inc.

Table of Contents

Table of Figures

Abstract

Agentic AI is shifting software from “answers” to “actions.” When an AI system can plan multi-step workflows and execute tool calls, it moves beyond content generation into state-changing operations with real-world impact. Wedge Networks calls this boundary the Agentic Edge: the operational perimeter where agentic workflows cross multiple trust boundaries, and where agents interact with identities, enterprise data, models, tools, and operational systems.

Agentic AI adds a new dimension to digital transformation: organizations increasingly solve problems with AI-driven autonomous processes that interpret intent, retrieve context, select a reasoning engine, plan across steps, and take actions that change real systems. Traditional security foundations remain essential, but autonomy introduces a critical new requirement: governing decisions and state-changing actions across a closed-loop workflow.

This whitepaper introduces a practical trust model for the Agentic Edge and presents WedgeSecure Agent, a microservices-based Policy Decision Point (PDP) that returns auditable, enforceable security decisions plus evidence across agentic workflows. WedgeSecure Agent complements common agent frameworks (for example NVIDIA NeMo Guardrails [4] and LangChain guardrails [5]) by providing enterprise-grade, compliance-grade controls for high-stakes deployments, including controls for prompt injection detection, content safety classification, secure model routing, and continuous authorization for autonomous actions.

If you are building or deploying agentic AI, and security, compliance, or audit-readiness is a requirement, this whitepaper will be of interest to you. We invite like-minded partners to collaborate with Wedge Networks through pilots and joint evaluations to help define and operationalize trustworthy agentic AI systems for the coming era.

1. Introduction: From Chatbots to Autonomous Actors

We are moving from AI that answers to AI that acts. That transition is not cosmetic. It changes the failure mode. A hallucinated sentence is embarrassing. A hallucinated tool call can change payroll, misroute funds, leak regulated data, or push an unsafe configuration to production.

Agentic AI is already being positioned as a new operating model for organizations and enterprise platforms because it can execute goal-directed work across tools and systems, not just generate text [1]. Enterprise platform roadmaps increasingly frame agentic AI as a foundation layer for executing work across business systems, not merely a chatbot interface [2]. It is a new dimension that brings with it new perimeters and vulnerabilities.



Figure 1 Trust Underpins Progress

According to a recent CSA survey [8], agent adoption is already mainstream (40% of organizations have agents in production and another 31% are running pilots or tests), but security is the dominant concern (55% cite sensitive data exposure and 52% cite unauthorized or unintended actions), and most enterprises still do not feel ready to pass an audit focused on agent behavior (only 16% are “very confident” in their audit readiness). From a historical perspective, as illustrated in Figure 1, every big leap throughout human history required a matching leap in trust mechanisms.

1.1 The Agentic Edge

We define the **Agentic Edge** as the boundary between the agentic AI realm and the conventional world, where users and machines supply context, constraints, and intent, and agents connect to models, knowledge, and tools to produce outcomes.

High-stakes impact is not limited to critical infrastructure. A breach of an agentic customer-service workflow can exfiltrate private customer data at scale. A breach of an agentic finance workflow can trigger fraudulent payments. A breach of an agentic IT ops workflow can roll out destructive config changes across fleets.

1.2 Autonomy Levels: A Practical Mental Map

A helpful analogy comes from "levels of automation" developed by SAE (Society of Automotive Engineers) in connected and automated vehicles (CAV). Wedge Networks applies the same lens to agentic AI to clarify how responsibility shifts from human to machine as autonomy increases.

As can be observed in Figure 2, each step up the ladder increases both value and blast radius. It also shifts the security objective from "filter bad outputs" to "control and prove safe decisions."



Figure 2 SAE Autonomy Ladder for Agentic Workflows

2. A Trust Model for the Agentic Edge

2.1 An Abstract Agentic Workflow

Agentic AI applications can be modeled as a closed-loop workflow that repeatedly **senses**, **reasons**, and **acts** against an evolving world state. Unlike conventional software, the "program" is not a fixed sequence of deterministic steps; it is a dynamic policy and planning loop in which a model selects actions, invokes tools, and updates the environment, then observes the consequences and iterates.

Figure 3 summarizes this abstract workflow as a sequence of steps, coupled by a world-state feedback loop:

- Inputs/Triggers: objective and constraints
- Sense/Observe: assemble working context (RAG, tools, state)
- Model Selection: pick governed reasoning endpoint
- Think/Decide: produce plan + next action request
- Act/Tool Call: execute, update state, capture outcomes
- Stop Condition: budgets, risk, escalation, termination



Figure 3 An Abstract Agentic AI Workflow

Unlike traditional AI systems that perform a single inference per request, agentic systems execute multi-step, stateful workflows. They sense their environment, select reasoning engines, plan actions, execute tool calls, and evaluate termination conditions. Most importantly, they update the world state and then re-observe it, forming a closed feedback loop.

Key to this abstract workflow is the External/Internal Environment, representing the mutable world state in which the agent operates. This includes:

- Enterprise knowledge repositories such as documents, databases, logs, and vector stores

- Runtime memory and session context
- Configuration and environmental variables
- The operational state of external systems (e.g., ticketing systems, payment systems, infrastructure components, SaaS platforms)

The agent does not reason in isolation. Its decisions are constructed over this evolving world state.

The world state feeds directly into the Sense/Observe stage. After actions are executed, the updated state becomes the basis for subsequent reasoning. This bidirectional relationship forms the core feedback loop of autonomous behavior.

The defining characteristic of the abstract agentic workflow is its closed-loop structure. This loop transforms the system from a stateless inference engine into a stateful autonomous actor. Each iteration compounds decisions and modifies the environment in which subsequent reasoning occurs.

This abstraction provides the foundation for defining trust boundaries and distributed security controls in agentic systems.

2.2 Trust Boundaries in the Agentic Workflow

The abstract workflow described in Section 2.1 clarifies how an agentic system functions. The next step is to identify where trust assumptions are made within that workflow.

A **trust boundary** is the interface where data, identity, or authority crosses from one trust domain to another, so it must be explicitly validated, constrained, and logged before being used or acted on. Attack surfaces in agentic systems appear at these boundaries, because they are the points where untrusted inputs can influence trusted reasoning or real-world actions. In traditional software systems, trust boundaries are relatively well defined: between user and application, between application and network, or between internal and external systems. Agentic systems introduce additional and more subtle trust boundaries because they combine reasoning, retrieval, tool invocation, and state mutation within a continuous loop. This risk is amplified by the "lethal trifecta" pattern: agents combine untrusted inputs**,** powerful tool access, and insufficiently constrained instructions**,** creating a high-leverage attack surface. [3]

To reason rigorously about security and governance, we define trust boundaries as points where the system must decide whether information, models, actions, or identities can be relied upon.

Within the agentic workflow, four primary trust boundaries emerge.

2.2.1 Trust Boundary 1: Human or Other Agent Originated Intent

The first boundary arises at Inputs/Triggers.

The system receives instructions from users, other agents, schedules, or external alerts. At this boundary, the agent must determine:

- Whether the requester is authenticated and authorized
- Whether the stated intent aligns with policy
- Whether the instruction attempts to override or bypass constraints
- Whether sensitive data is being requested outside of scope

Unlike deterministic software, agentic systems interpret natural language instructions. This creates ambiguity and increases susceptibility to manipulation.

If intent validation is weak, downstream stages will reason over compromised instructions. The entire loop then operates under false premises.

2.2.2 Trust Boundary 2: Retrieved and Observed Context

The second boundary exists within the Sense/Observe stage.

Agentic systems dynamically construct context by retrieving documents, querying APIs, and inspecting external system states. The system must assume that some of this content is untrusted.

This boundary raises critical questions:

- Is retrieved content authentic?
- Has it been tampered with or poisoned?
- Does it contain instructions intended to hijack behavior?
- Does retrieval exceed authorized scope?
- Is cross-tenant or cross-domain data isolation maintained?

Because retrieved content becomes part of the reasoning input, it directly influences plan generation and tool selection.

In effect, this stage merges trusted internal state with potentially untrusted external information. The integrity of that merge determines whether reasoning remains aligned with policy.

2.2.3 Trust Boundary 3: Model Governance and Routing

The third boundary appears at Model Selection.

In many implementations, model selection is treated as a technical optimization problem – balancing cost, latency, and sophistication. In agentic systems, however, model choice is also a trust decision.

Different models may:

- Operate in different hosting environments
- Have different retention or logging behaviors
- Possess different tool-calling capabilities
- Demonstrate varying levels of robustness to manipulation

The system must therefore determine:

- Whether the selected model is approved for the task and data classification
- Whether routing has been manipulated
- Whether version drift has occurred
- Whether the endpoint identity is authentic

Compromise at this boundary undermines the reliability of all subsequent reasoning.

2.2.4 Trust Boundary 4: Action Authorization and State Mutation

The final boundary lies within the Act/Tool Call stage.

Here, reasoning is translated into concrete external effects. Tool calls may:

- Modify infrastructure
- Send communications
- Update financial records
- Change access controls
- Trigger additional workflows

At this boundary, the system must evaluate:

- Whether the agent is authorized to execute the action
- Whether the target environment is correct
- Whether parameters remain within safe bounds
- Whether repeated execution is controlled
- Whether actions are logged and attributable

This is the highest-impact boundary because actions modify the world state and influence future iterations of the loop.

2.2.5 The Compounding Nature of Trust Failure

A defining property of agentic systems is that these trust boundaries are not isolated. They are linked through feedback:

- An unvalidated instruction may lead to poisoned retrieval
- Poisoned retrieval may influence model selection or planning
- Compromised planning may produce unsafe tool invocation
- Unsafe tool invocation modifies the world state
- The modified world state becomes the basis for the next reasoning cycle

This compounding effect differentiates agentic systems from static inference systems. Security failures can propagate across iterations and amplify over time.

Therefore, trust in agentic systems cannot be enforced at a single checkpoint. It must be continuously evaluated across the entire workflow.

2.2.6 Implications for High-Stakes Deployments

In low-risk use cases, occasional misalignment may be tolerable. In high-stakes environments – such as financial operations, healthcare workflows, infrastructure management, or enterprise data handling – the cost of trust failure is materially significant.

The distribution of trust boundaries across the workflow implies that:

- Security must be stage-aware
- Authorization must be continuous
- Model governance must be explicit
- Tool invocation must be constrained
- State mutation must be auditable

2.3 Attack Surfaces Across Trust Boundaries

Having defined the four trust boundaries, we now enumerate the primary attack surfaces at each boundary. These describe how an adversary can cross a boundary with malicious influence, and what must be controlled and logged. The attack surface of an agentic system is distributed across the four trust boundaries: intent intake, context ingestion, model routing, and authorized action/state mutation. Figure 4 summarizes these boundary-aligned attack surfaces and representative attack vectors.

Figure 4 Attack Surfaces and Vectors



2.3.1 Attack Surface: Intent Boundary

The Inputs/Triggers stage represents the initial entry point into the agent loop. Because instructions are often expressed in natural language, adversarial manipulation can be subtle and contextual.

Key attack vectors include:

- **Direct prompt injection:** Malicious instructions designed to override system constraints, bypass policies, or redirect the agent's objective
- **Role or authority spoofing**: Attempts to impersonate privileged roles within prompts, such as claiming administrative authority or policy override rights
- **Trigger flooding (Denial-of-Service pressure)**: Repeated or excessive activation events intended to overwhelm automation workflows or induce unsafe behavior under load
- **Prompt-based exfiltration attempts**: Instructions crafted to extract sensitive information beyond authorized scope

If compromised at this stage, downstream reasoning operates under manipulated intent.

2.3.2 Attack Surface: Context Boundary

In the Sense/Observe stage, the agent constructs context by retrieving data and inspecting the world state. Because retrieved content becomes part of the reasoning input, this stage represents a major attack surface.

Key attack vectors include:

- **Indirect injection via retrieved content**: Malicious instructions embedded within documents, web pages, or knowledge bases that are incorporated into context
- **Retrieval poisoning (knowledge base seeding)**: Insertion of adversarial content into enterprise repositories to influence future reasoning cycles
- **Over-broad retrieval (excessive context exposure)**: Retrieval mechanisms that pull more data than necessary, increasing the risk of unintended disclosure
- **Cross-tenant retrieval bypass**: Exploitation of authorization weaknesses to access data across tenant or domain boundaries
- **Source spoofing**: Fabrication of authoritative-looking documents (e.g., fake internal policies) that manipulate reasoning

This stage merges trusted system state with potentially untrusted content, making boundary enforcement critical.

2.3.3 Attack Surface: Model Boundary

Model selection determines which reasoning engine executes the task. In agentic systems, this is both a performance decision and a governance decision.

Key attack vectors include:

- **Shadow or unapproved model substitution**: Routing requests to non-approved models outside governance controls
- **Silent model or version drift**: Undocumented changes to model versions that alter behavior without oversight
- **Routing manipulation**: Forcing selection of weaker or less robust models to increase susceptibility to exploitation
- **Endpoint spoofing or routing abuse**: Redirecting inference requests to malicious or unintended endpoints

Compromise at this stage undermines the integrity of the reasoning process itself.

2.3.4 Attack Surface: Action Authorization and State Mutation Boundary

The Think/Decide stage is not itself an attack surface; it is an internal computational process. However, it produces *decision artifacts* (chosen tools, targets, parameters, and execution plans)

that can be influenced by upstream trust boundaries (Intent, Context, Model). The actual security exposure occurs when those artifacts are converted into actions that mutate external state.

The Action Authorization and State Mutation boundary is the point where an agent's internal reasoning becomes an externally observable commitment, such as a tool invocation, a write to a database, a transaction, a configuration change, a network request, or a cyber-physical actuation. This boundary is crossed whenever the workflow transitions from **planning** to **changing state**. Accordingly, the security objective here is not to 'secure reasoning,' but to prevent manipulated plans from becoming authorized state changes.

A) Pre-action manipulation signals

Adversaries often aim to shape the plan so that the agent later requests a high-impact action that appears "reasonable" inside the workflow. Representative patterns include:

- **Goal hijacking across steps (intent drift):** the plan gradually deviates from the original user objective toward attacker objectives, often through chained manipulation across multiple iterations
- **Unsafe plan steps:** the agent proposes steps that violate policy, safety, or compliance constraints, even if the language is framed as operationally necessary
- **Tool selection beyond intended scope:** the agent selects a tool or capability that exceeds the permitted scope for the task (capability escalation), such as shifting from read-only retrieval to external communication or write operations
- **Weak provenance and explainability gaps:** missing linkage between the proposed action and the originating intent/context, making it hard to audit why the action was justified

These are not attacks "on reasoning." They are attempts to influence the agent's internal decision state.

B) Execution abuses (realized in Act/Tool Call as state mutation)

When the workflow reaches execution, the boundary becomes concrete and the attack surface expands to include real-world interfaces:

- **Unauthorized tool invocation attempt:** the agent calls a tool it should not be allowed to use for the current identity, tenant, purpose, or risk level
- **Wrong target or environment:** actions are redirected to unintended destinations (wrong tenant/account, prod vs. dev, attacker-controlled endpoints, unsafe network zones)
- **Parameter injection:** arguments are crafted to trigger unintended behavior (URLs, query strings, file paths, payload fields, command-like strings, or hidden instructions inside structured data)
- **Outbound exfiltration via "legitimate" channels:** sensitive data is exported through approved integrations (email, webhooks, cloud storage, ticketing/chat tools) under a plausible operational pretext

- **Retry amplification and action loops:** repeated execution, fan-out, or self-triggered loops magnify impact and cost, turning a small deviation into a material incident

Because actions update the world state, compromise at this stage feeds directly into subsequent reasoning cycles.

2.3.5 Compounding Risk in Closed-Loop Systems

As described previously, a defining characteristic of agentic systems is that these attack vectors do not operate independently:

- Manipulated inputs influence retrieved context
- Compromised context affects model selection and planning
- Manipulated plans produce unsafe tool invocations
- Tool invocations modify world state
- The updated world state becomes the basis for the next reasoning cycle

This compounding dynamic differentiates agentic AI from traditional stateless AI systems. The attack surface is continuous and stateful, requiring controls that operate across the entire workflow rather than at a single checkpoint.

2.4 Policy Enforcement in Agentic Era Security Operations

The four trust boundaries defined in Section 2.2 describe what must be decided: Intent, Context, Model, and Authority**.** In production systems, the next question is where those decisions are enforced. Agentic applications rarely have a single universal chokepoint, so enforcement must occur at multiple **Policy Enforcement Points (PEPs)** while policy decisions remain centralized in a **Policy Decision Point (PDP)**. This observation sets the foundation for a policy decision control plane that operates across these trust boundaries rather than at a single enforcement point. Accordingly, these boundaries motivate a centralized PDP with multiple enforcement points.

Figure 5 illustrates this operating model: a centralized Policy Decision Point (PDP) implemented as microservices, driving consistent enforcement through multiple Policy Enforcement Points (PEPs). The PDP evaluates each step of an agentic workflow and outputs **structured decisions plus evidence**. The decision output is machine-consumable (for example: allow, deny, restrict, require step-up controls, or constrain execution), while the evidence output captures the rationale and metadata required for auditability, monitoring, and compliance (what was checked, which policy applied, and why the action was permitted or blocked).



Figure 5 Distributed Policy Enforcement Model

Agentic systems rarely share a single universal chokepoint, so this model is designed to drive consistent enforcement through several complementary Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) classes.

Application PEPs enforce policy inside the agent runtime code using tool wrappers (gating tool invocation) and step budgets (bounding steps, retries, cost, and execution scope).

Security/Network PEPs enforce decisions using existing enterprise controls such as gateways, SWG, DLP, CASB, segmentation, firewalls, and egress controls, constraining reachability and reducing exfiltration paths even when application behavior is probabilistic.

Cyber-Physical PEPs enforce decisions at actuation boundaries through safety interlocks and actuation limits, ensuring autonomous actions remain within safe operating envelopes.

With this model, policy decisions can be made centrally which allows for streamlined auditability, better access and management of the intent-based configurations which define policies in terms of purpose and allowable outcomes, and standardize decisioning, so enforcement is consistent regardless of where it must occur.

3. WedgeSecure Agent: Policy Decision Microservices for Continuous Trust Enforcement

Agentic AI is a new dimension of digital transformation: we now solve problems with AI-driven autonomous processes that interpret intent, retrieve context, select a reasoning engine, plan across steps, and take actions that change real systems. The "old" security foundation governs mostly deterministic digital infrastructure: identity and access for humans and services, network segmentation and endpoint protection, application and data security, and operational assurance (monitoring, incident response, audit evidence). The "new" builds on all of that and adds a critical dimension: **governing autonomous decisions and actions across a closed-loop workflow.**

Because agentic workflows are iterative and stateful, trust must be enforced continuously. A compromised instruction, poisoned retrieval, or unsafe tool call does not remain localized; it propagates forward through planning and execution, and then feeds back into the next cycle as a new world state. Industry guidance is increasingly treating autonomous agents as a distinct security and governance problem, with emphasis on tool-use risk, policy enforcement, and evidence generation. [8]

WedgeSecure Agent exists to make this new dimension deployable under enterprise risk and compliance expectations. It provides **policy decision microservices** that continuously evaluate trust across agentic perimeters and output structured decisions plus audit-grade evidence.

3.1 What is WedgeSecure Agent

WedgeSecure Agent implements the policy decision layer for the four trust boundaries introduced in Section 2.2: **Intent, Context, Model, and Authority**. It returns structured decisions and evidence that are enforced at the PEPs described in Section 2.4.

WedgeSecure Agent is implemented as a collection of agentic AI security function microservices packaged in four new modules added to the WedgeSecure Platform: Agent Intent, Agent Context, Agent Model and Agent Authority, with the Network Security Platform providing deterministic enforcement support at the network perimeter.

Each WedgeSecure Agent API call from an agentic application returns a **Decision Bundle** described in PDP Output Schema, with three parts: **(1) decision** (allow, deny, restrict, step-up), **(2) constraints** (what is allowed and under what limits: scope, targets, parameters, budgets), and **(3) evidence bundle** (policy IDs, scores, matched conditions, timestamps, model/tool identifiers, and rationale). Applications and enforcement points consume the decision and constraints, while the evidence bundle feeds audit, monitoring, and compliance reporting.

WedgeSecure Agent does not assume there is one universal interception point in an agentic application. Instead, it produces decisions and evidence that can be enforced in multiple locations, depending on how the agent is built and deployed.

The remainder of Section 3 describes the WedgeSecure Agent modules and microservices that implement policy decisions guarding of the agentic AI trust boundaries.

3.2 Guarding the Agentic Trust Boundaries

WedgeSecure Agent secures all trust boundaries of the agentic workflow by providing the following modules to support policy decisions:

- **Network Security Platform (NSP),** the WedgeSecure Platform's foundational deep content inspection and deterministic network controls. **NSP** can operate as a **PEP** (inline enforcement) or as a **PDP signal source** in **detect-only mode**, emitting risk scores and evidence to drive policy decisions elsewhere.
- **Agent Intent**: Prompt Injection Classifier (**PIC),** instruction integrity for direct and indirect prompt injection
- **Agent Context**: Content Safety Classifier **(CSC),** content safety and regulated-data compliance classification across the loop
- **Agent Model**: Model Reputation Database **(MRDB),** model trust and routing governance (model is the "reasoning authority")
- **Agent Authority**: Authentication & Authorization Layer **(AAL)**, authentication, authorization, delegated authority, and provenance for actions

Figure 6 Functional Modules of WedgeSecure Agent

These modules of WedgeSecure Agent are illustrated in Figure 6.

3.3 Network Security Platform (NSP): the Network Security Layer

NSP is built on WedgeSecure's proven and patented v3.x stack, providing AI-driven network security policy decisions and real-time enforcement (NGFW/UTM/SWG class capabilities).

Many framework guardrails are best-effort and often rely on static pattern matching (for example, regex-based PII rules). NSP complements these controls by applying deep content inspection to produce higher-fidelity security signals and evidence. In detect-only mode, NSP functions as a policy decision signal generator; in enforce mode, it provides deterministic containment at the network perimeter.

In agentic systems, the network perimeter remains a high-value enforcement point because it controls:

- Which destinations an agent can reach (tool egress, API calls, webhooks)
- Segmentation boundaries between agent, tools, and sensitive systems
- Outbound exfiltration channels even when application logic is compromised

In addition, NSP is integrated with Wedge Networks patented deep inspection technology which allows for real-time prevention of intrusion attacks and data exfiltration.

NSP provides deterministic enforcement where probabilistic AI controls should not be relied upon. In addition, since NSPs are typically deployed at network choking points, they are also part of the Policy Enforcement fabric to enforce policies to secure the agentic AI applications.

3.4 Agent Intent: Prompt Injection Classifier (PIC)

PIC is designed to detect prompt injection and goal hijacking in the form that actually appears in agentic systems: cross-step, cross-context, and frequently indirect.

3.4.1 Three-stream Detection: Intent, Knowledge, Decision

Prompt injection in agentic systems is no longer limited to “malicious user prompts.” In real deployments, instructions can be smuggled through retrieved context (RAG/memory/skill files) and can emerge later as the agent proposes tool calls. PIC is therefore designed as a **triple-stream cross-context semantic classifier** that detects manipulation by jointly analyzing three information streams in the agent loop:

- **Intent (User Prompt):** the explicit task request and authorized scope defined by the user
- **Knowledge (Memory / Skill Files / RAG Context):** long-term memory, skill definitions, and retrieved context that may influence decision-making

- **Decision (Proposed Tool Calls):** the agent's proposed action, including tool type, parameters, and target environment



Figure 7 Semantic Conflict Detection With PIC

PIC cross-validates these streams to ensure that the **proposed action remains anchored** to (1) the authorized scope of the user's intent and (2) enforced privilege boundaries. The key signal is **cross-stream semantic conflict**: when the Decision stream expresses actions that are not semantically justified by the Intent stream, or are disproportionately influenced by Knowledge that contains embedded override instructions, as illustrated in Figure 7.

3.4.2 Security Outputs (Structured Signals)

PIC does not return a binary "safe/unsafe" label. It emits structured security signals that enable precise policy decisions, including:

- Whether a semantic attack vector is detected
- Which stream is likely compromised (Intent, Knowledge, or Decision)
- The inferred attack category (for example: instruction override, privilege escalation, context-role shifting)

These outputs are designed to be consumed by the WedgeSecure Agent PDP layer (and enforced by the framework/PEPs) as allow/deny/restrict decisions and as audit-grade evidence.

3.4.3 Training Strategy for Zero-day Generalization

PIC is trained to detect **semantic inconsistency patterns** rather than keyword signatures. To simulate realistic agent attacks, the training pipeline synthesizes large-scale "poisoned contexts" (100k+) where memory/skill files or tool-derived context embed delayed "goal hijacking" instructions and cross-context override attempts.

To improve generalization, training focuses on abstract attack patterns (instruction override, privilege escalation, context-role shifting) instead of fixed strings, improving robustness against new jailbreak variations.

3.4.4 Edge-ready Deployment (Real-time, Tamper-resistant)

PIC is built for real-time edge deployment using a **student–teacher distillation** approach: a large teacher model generates diverse adversarial scenarios; a lightweight student classifier learns compact semantic conflict representations; the student is then optimized for edge acceleration.

The edge deployment design includes:

- Compact backbones suitable for edge constraints (e.g., DistilRoBERTa / DeBERTa-v3-Small)
- INT8 quantization via Intel tooling (OpenVINO + NNCF) to reduce model size and latency with minimal accuracy loss
- Optional offload to Intel NPUs to isolate security inference from the main agent compute pipeline
- Optional hosting inside a hardware enclave (Intel SGX/TEE) to reduce the risk of tampering or disabling the security layer

3.5 Agent Context: Content Safety Classifier (CSC)

CSC (Content Safety Classification) is the policy and compliance pillar of WedgeSecure Agent that determines whether content flowing through an agentic workflow is safe and permissible under enterprise policy. In agentic systems, content risk is not confined to the final response. Unsafe, disallowed, or sensitive content can enter and influence decisions at multiple points, including user input, retrieved context (RAG), intermediate planning steps, tool inputs, and model outputs. CSC therefore operates as a **multi-stage classifier** that continuously evaluates content at each of these checkpoints and produces a structured **safety verdict** that can be consumed by policy logic.

3.5.1 Multi-stage Checkpoints Aligned to the Agentic Loop

CSC evaluates content across five practical stages:

- **User Input:** the prompt or trigger payload that initiates the workflow
- **Retrieved Context:** documents, long-term memory, and skill files introduced via retrieval
- **Planning Steps:** intermediate reasoning artifacts (proposed steps, intent statements, tool selection rationale)
- **Tool Inputs:** tool arguments, URLs, payloads, and sensitive parameters at the action boundary
- **Model Output:** responses, summaries, reports, or external messages generated for downstream use

This design ensures CSC can prevent policy violations **before** they become actions (for example, by flagging unsafe plan steps or dangerous tool parameters), not only after the system generates output.

3.5.2 Best-of-breed Ensemble, Unified Verdict

CSC is implemented as a **best-of-breed ensemble** of specialized classifiers and detectors that work together to maximize efficacy and reduce blind spots. Instead of relying on a single monolithic filter, CSC composes complementary submodules such as:

- **General safety classification** for broad policy categories
- **Prompt/context safety detectors** tuned for indirect and retrieval-borne risks
- **Sensitive and regulated-data detectors** aligned to enterprise data governance
- **Domain-specific rule matchers** reflecting tenant policy (finance, healthcare, OT, etc.)
- **Consistency checks** across stages to catch violations that only emerge after retrieval or planning

The PDP policy logic then orchestrates these signals into a single **classification verdict**, with machine-consumable outputs that are stable across workflows and deployment patterns.

3.5.3 Outputs: Verdict Plus Policy Signals

CSC outputs a structured verdict suitable for enterprise enforcement and audit. At minimum, this includes:

- **Multi-label policy tags** (what policy categories were implicated)
- **Severity and confidence** (how risky, how certain)
- **Traceable evidence** (what was evaluated and why it was labeled)

These outputs allow downstream policy logic to implement consistent actions such as allow, deny, constrain, transform (redact/rewrite), or escalate to human approval, while preserving an evidence trail for monitoring and compliance.

3.5.4 Why CSC Matters in High-stakes Agentic Systems



Figure 8 CSC: Multi-Stage Content Moderation

In high-stakes deployments, content violations are not only reputational risks; they can cause financial loss, regulatory exposure, and operational harm. CSC makes content safety a continuous runtime control in the agent loop, ensuring that disallowed content does not silently enter through retrieval, does not shape unsafe plans, and does not escape via tool calls or generated outputs.

Figure 8 depicts multi-stage inputs feeding CSC and producing a safety verdict and structured policy signals.

3.6 Agent Model: Model Reputation Database (MRDB)

MRDB is the security brain behind model selection. In modern agentic applications, “model selection” is not just a cost or latency optimization problem. It is a trust decision: which model (and which endpoint) is safe enough for this specific intent, this specific data context, and this specific action risk.

3.6.1 Baseline: What a Standard LLM Router Provides

Most production agentic stacks already include, or are moving toward, a **router / gateway layer** that abstracts multiple model providers behind an OpenAI-compatible API. NVIDIA’s LLM Router

blueprint is a representative example: it supports multiple providers (including OpenAI-style endpoints) and can dynamically choose a model for a request. [6]

This matters for WedgeSecure Agent because MRDB is designed to **plug into these standard routing patterns**. The agentic application does not need to be rewritten. Instead, routing becomes "policy-aware" by consulting MRDB for trust decisions.

3.6.2 What MRDB Adds: Security-aware Routing, Not Just Utility-aware Routing

A generic router answers: *Which model is cheapest or best for quality?*
MRDB answers: *Which model is trusted enough to be allowed for this request, in this environment, under this policy, with evidence?*

MRDB functions as a **Model Governance registry** that continuously maintains:

- **Model identity and provenance controls**
  Model name, version, vendor, hosting location, endpoint identity, allowed regions, cryptographic fingerprints/attestations where applicable, and change history
- **Security reputation scores** across multiple risk dimensions
  These are derived from repeatable evaluation suites (internal and research-driven) and normalized into policy-consumable ratings
- **Policy constraints and routing directives**
  For example: "PII present, only route to models with proven leakage resistance above threshold X and hosted in approved sovereignty zone Y"
- **Evidence artifacts** to support audits and compliance
  What was selected, why it was selected, what the model's current risk posture is, and what tests justify that posture. Example MRDB record (minimal):
    - **model_id**: vendor:model-family
    - **version**: semantic version or hash
    - **approved_tasks**: summarize, classify, code-assist
    - **data_classes**: public, internal, pii, regulated
    - **trust_scores**: jailbreak, leakage, tool-use, refusal
    - **last_eval_time**: timestamp + evaluation suite ID

3.6.3 What MRDB Measures: Trust Dimensions That Matter for Agentic Risk

MRDB tracks security posture using a set of dimensions aligned to real agentic failure modes. MRDB maintains ratings such as:

- **Tool-use policy compliance** (hijacking and excessive-agency behavior)
- **Data leakage risk (secrets and PII)** across multiple leakage pathways
- **Instruction hierarchy integrity** (does the model preserve system and policy priority under pressure)
- **Refusal reliability** for disallowed requests and unsafe intent

- **Jailbreak resilience** including escalation patterns (for example, crescendo-style attacks)

These categories are important because they map directly to "closed-loop autonomy" risks: even a model that is strong at general Q&A can become unsafe when it is placed inside a plan-act-retry workflow that touches tools and sensitive systems.

3.6.4 Data Acquisition: Broad Model Coverage with Continuous, Adversarial Testing

MRDB is designed for **breadth and freshness**:

1. **Broad coverage of LLMs and endpoints**
   MRDB is not limited to a single provider. It maintains profiles for public models, enterprise models, on-prem models, and domain-tuned models, with version-aware records
2. **Automated robustness testing using leading tools (example: promptfoo)**
   A test harness can apply a battery of targeted "payload generators" (plugins) to evaluate how an LLM behaves under specific adversarial pressures. In MRDB, these test outcomes are normalized into the trust dimensions above (hallucination tendency, hijack susceptibility, overreliance, and multiple PII leakage categories), then turned into policy-ready scores
3. **Continuous update loops (not one-time certification)**
   Because model versions drift and safety behavior changes, MRDB treats trust as time-varying. The database continuously ingests new test results and updates reputation scores, with full history retained for auditability

3.6.5 Crowdsourcing and Sharing: MISP-style Trust Intelligence Exchange

To scale trust intelligence beyond any single lab, MRDB supports a community and partner-driven ingestion model inspired by threat intelligence sharing.

MRDB can integrate with platforms like **MISP**, which is designed to collect, store, and share structured threat intelligence via APIs. [7]

In the MRDB context, "trust intelligence" can include:

- Model/version risk bulletins (for example, newly observed jailbreak regressions)
- Evaluation artifacts and scorecards
- Endpoint compromise reports and routing blocklists
- Policy-ready indicators (which models should be restricted for which data classes)

This enables Wedge and its ecosystem (customers, MSSPs, university labs) to improve coverage and responsiveness the same way the security industry scaled IOC sharing.

3.6.6 Integration: MRDB as a drop-in policy source for standard routers



Figure 9 MRDB Data Pipeline & Operations

MRDB exposes policy-consumable outputs through **RESTful APIs** that can be used by:

- Nvidia NeMo LLM Router-style gateways (OpenAI-compatible routing flows)
- In-house routing layers
- Agent frameworks that already support "model selection hooks"

In effect, the router remains the operational "switchboard" while MRDB supplies the **security truth** needed to make that switchboard enterprise-grade. As a result, model selection becomes a controlled, explainable, auditable trust decision, continuously updated, and aligned with closed-loop agentic risk.

Figure 9 summarizes how MRDB combines shared trust intelligence and automated testing with router-compatible APIs to deliver policy-aware model selection plus auditable evidence.

3.7 Agent Authority: Authentication and Authorization Layer (AAL) for Autonomous Actions

AAL is a Policy Decision Point (PDP) microservice for agents. It provides a centralized decision interface that agentic applications invoke whenever an agent is about to access a protected resource (data, tool, API, service, device, or cyber-physical actuator). AAL returns a **structured authorization verdict plus evidence**, enabling applications to enforce decisions consistently while producing audit-grade records.

Before evaluating access permissions, AAL verifies the identity and integrity of the requesting agent and its execution context (e.g., workload identity, delegated user context, and token validity). This authentication step ensures that every request is attributable to a known and trusted principal.

Autonomous actions force **continuous authorization at each step**, not a one-time login decision. A useful conventional analogy is **"authorization-as-a-service"** in modern enterprise IT: an application does not embed complex access rules locally; it consults a centralized PDP (for example, an ABAC policy engine) that evaluates identity, context, and policy before access is granted. AAL follows this pattern but extends it to the agentic setting where access decisions must account for factors that traditional IAM does not typically evaluate at execution time: agent provenance, delegated authority chains, purpose binding, and behavior-driven trust signals.

3.7.1 Why AAL is Needed: Two Concrete Problem Drivers

Problem 1: The identity and authorization landscape for agents is fragmented. Existing mechanisms (OAuth/OIDC, workload identity, capability tokens) were designed primarily for humans and static services, not autonomous agents that delegate tasks, call tools, and act continuously across edge and cyber-physical environments. AAL addresses this gap by unifying agent identity primitives, delegation traceability, trust signals, and enforcement-oriented decisioning into one coherent layer.

Problem 2: Enterprises need a practical, enforcement-oriented PDP for agent-originated requests. Even in a simple agentic utility (for example, an AI-assisted file search agent), OS-level permissions can say "this user can read that file," but they cannot evaluate "which agent is acting," "on whose authority," "for what declared purpose," "within what delegated scope," and "is the behavior consistent with the intent." AAL fills this gap by producing fine-grained decisions such as allow, deny, restrict, or step-up, with auditable justification.

3.7.2 How AAL Works in the Agentic Workflow

The AAL workflow can be described as a repeatable decision loop:

1. **Task delegation and access request.** A user creates or triggers an agent and delegates a task. As the agent attempts to access edge resources or call tools, it sends an **access request** to AAL for a decision (rather than assuming access is safe by default)
2. **Authentication: establishing agent identity with strong provenance.** AAL validates "who/what is acting" using a set of identity and provenance signals commonly needed for software actors, including:

    - Cryptographic identity binding (signed credentials linked to an agent identity)
    - Code provenance (signed binaries or container images, hashes, SBOM references)
    - Execution environment integrity (attestation evidence where available)

- Delegation lineage (who delegated authority, when, under what scope, whether scope was attenuated)

3. **Authorization: evaluating whether this action is permitted now.** AAL evaluates the request using policy and context, not just static permissions. In particular, AAL can reason over:

   - The agent identity and its provenance claims
   - The delegated authority chain and scope constraints
   - The declared purpose and task context
   - The target resource, environment (prod vs dev), and parameters
   - Lightweight behavior or risk indicators (for example, unusual access patterns)

4. **Decision and evidence.** AAL returns a structured verdict such as:

   - **ALLOW** (within policy and scope)
   - **DENY** (violates policy or provenance requirements)
   - **RESTRICT** (allow with narrowed scope, safer parameters, reduced capability)
   - **STEP-UP / ESCALATE** (require explicit approval or stronger assurance)

   Along with the verdict, AAL returns **evidence**: policy rule IDs, matched conditions, critical context signals, and provenance checks that justify the decision.

5. **Continuous monitoring and adaptive risk scoring.** AAL is designed for closed-loop autonomy. Decisions, outcomes, and behavior features can be logged and fed into an adaptive risk scoring mechanism, which informs subsequent decisions. This creates a measurable “trust over time” control, rather than one-time admission control.

3.7.3 What AAL enables in high-stakes agentic systems



Figure 10 AAL as a Policy Decision Point for Continuous Authorization of Agent Actions

By treating agents as first-class principals and binding action to delegation and purpose, AAL enables enterprise-grade controls that are difficult to achieve with conventional IAM alone:

- Prevents delegation overreach by enforcing explicit scope and attenuation
- Reduces “wrong target / wrong environment” failures (tenant boundary, prod vs dev)
- Constrains tool misuse through purpose-aware authorization

Figure 10 illustrates the Authentication and Authorization Layer (AAL) as a Policy Decision Point (PDP) for autonomous actions. When an AI agent issues an access or execution request, AAL authenticates the requesting principal (e.g., via cryptographic identity mechanisms where deployed), validates delegation lineage and scope, evaluates contextual risk signals, and applies policy logic before returning a structured authorization verdict with supporting evidence. This ensures that every autonomous action is subject to identity verification, policy evaluation, and structured audit logging, rather than relying solely on static permissions or one-time session checks.

4. The Anatomy of a Secure Agentic Application

Sections 2 and 3 defined the trust boundaries, attack surfaces, the PDP/PEP enforcement model, and WedgeSecure Agent as a comprehensive PDP microservices system. This section translates the model into implementation-ready control objectives and evidence requirements.

4.1 The Gates That Guard the Trust Boundaries

A secure agentic application must continuously preserve four trust boundaries across its closed-loop workflow. Practically, this means every cycle through the agent loop passes **four trust gates** (policy decision points) before reasoning is allowed to proceed and before actions are allowed to mutate state. These gates are not "product features" in isolation; they are architectural security conditions that must hold at every step, please refer to Figure 11.



Figure 11 Trust Gates Supported by WedgeSecure Agent

Gate 1 (Intent Boundary): Trust the Intent

Question: Is the incoming request authentic, in-scope, and free of instruction manipulation?

Typical checks:

- Direct prompt injection and instruction override attempts
- Role / authority spoofing and session hijack signals
- Exfiltration-oriented requests and policy bypass patterns
- Trigger flooding / automated prompt spam

Enforced by: **PIC (Prompt Injection Classifier)**

Gate 2 (Context Boundary): Trust the Context

Question: Is the context entering the reasoning loop safe, relevant, and authorized for this purpose?

Typical checks:

- Indirect prompt injection embedded in retrieved content or tool outputs
- Retrieval poisoning, saturation, and “attention hijack” content
- Overly broad retrieval that expands exposure beyond need-to-know
- Cross-tenant / cross-domain context boundary bypass attempts
- Source spoofing and untrusted data provenance

Enforced by: CSC classifies and constrains what enters context; AAL authorizes access; PIC may be invoked as an additional detector when retrieved content exhibits instruction-override patterns.

Gate 3 (Model Boundary): Trust the Model

Question: Is the selected model governed, fit-for-task, and sufficiently robust for the data sensitivity and risk profile?

Typical checks:

- Approved model endpoints and versions only
- Routing governance (task, data class, jurisdiction, tenancy)
- Security reputation and robustness scores (misuse, leakage, jailbreak resilience)
- Drift awareness, re-evaluation cadence, and fallback policy

Enforced by: **MRDB (Model Trust and Routing Database)** and **AAL (for model endpoint authorization)**

Gate 4 (Authority Boundary): Trust the Action

Question: When reasoning becomes action and state mutation, is the agent authorized to do *this* action, *to that* target, *with these* parameters, *under this* integrity posture?

Typical checks:

- Identity binding and strong authentication of the calling principal (user, agent, service)
- Delegation lineage (who authorized whom, with what attenuation and expiry)
- Scope, purpose, and tenant constraints mapped to tool capabilities
- Target and environment controls (prod vs dev, allowed resources, safe destinations)
- Runtime integrity signals (attestation, trusted execution, policy-required posture)
- Action-time payload screening (PIC/CSC) for parameter injection or unsafe content

Enforced by: **AAL (Authentication and Authorization Layer)** with **PIC/CSC** as action-time inspectors when needed

In summary: the four gates map cleanly to the four trust boundaries: **Intent, Context, Model, Authority**. Together they ensure that (1) what enters the agent loop is trustworthy, (2) what the

agent sees is safe and authorized, (3) what the agent uses to reason is governed, and (4) what the agent does is continuously authorized, constrained, and audit-ready.

4.2 Security Controls Across the Agentic Workflow

The agentic workflow can be implemented as a sequence of operational steps (trigger, observe, select model, plan, act, stop). For a secure system, each step must also satisfy one or more of the **four trust boundaries** defined in Section 4.1: **Intent, Context, Model, and Authority**. The table below maps (1) what must be decided at each step, (2) which trust boundary is being exercised, (3) which WedgeSecure Agent policy decision microservices are consulted, and (4) what evidence must be produced to support audit and compliance.

Workflow step	Control objectives (what to decide)	Boundary checks (PDP services)	Evidence to log (what to prove)
Inputs / Triggers	Determine whether the request is legitimate, in-scope, and policy-safe before the agent enters a planning loop. Bind the request to identity, tenant, and delegated scope; establish initial budgets and constraints.	**Intent** (PIC) for injection/spoofing signals; **Context** (CSC) for disallowed/regulated requests; **Authority** (AAL) for identity binding, delegation, and scope	Input hash + metadata; identity claims; delegation chain; tenant and purpose tags; PIC score/tags + rationale; CSC labels/severity + rationale; allow/deny/restrict decision; initial budgets (step/time/tool)
Sense / Observe (RAG, memory, world state)	Control what external information is allowed to influence reasoning. Ensure retrieval is authorized by purpose, sensitivity, and tenant boundary; prevent poisoned or disallowed content from entering context; apply required redaction/transforms.	**Context** (CSC) to classify retrieved content and detect policy violations; **Authority** (AAL) to authorize source access and enforce tenant/purpose constraints	Retrieval source identifiers and provenance pointers; access decisions (allow/deny/restrict); data classification labels; redaction/transformation actions; citations/provenance links when applicable; context hashes/snapshots as needed for audit
Model Selection	Select only approved models/endpoints for the task and data sensitivity. Prevent shadow routing, endpoint spoofing, and silent model/version drift; apply routing constraints and fallbacks.	**Model** (MRDB) for approved routing and trust posture; **Authority** (AAL) to authorize endpoint use under scope, residency, and contractual constraints	Model chosen (id), version, endpoint identity; matched routing rule/policy clause; MRDB trust posture snapshot (scores/tags/time); authorization decision; fallback path and reason if selected
Think / Decide (planning and step selection)	This is an internal reasoning phase, not a trust boundary by itself. The objective is to keep planning constrained by the boundaries: maintain alignment to the user's intent, prevent goal hijack and policy-unsafe plan steps, and gate high-risk actions before execution.	**Intent** (PIC) for multi-step intent drift / goal hijack indicators; **Context** (CSC) for unsafe or disallowed plan/output intent; **Authority** (AAL) for in-scope tool eligibility and step-up requirements	High-level plan trace (as appropriate); step-level risk indicators; PIC signals over time (drift markers, scores); CSC labels on proposed actions/outputs; policy overrides; escalation triggers; human approval records (if any)
Act / Tool Call	Authorize each tool invocation with correct identity, scope, target, and parameter constraints. Prevent unauthorized tool use, wrong-environment execution (prod/dev), parameter injection, exfiltration, and unsafe payloads; apply network constraints where applicable.	**Authority** (AAL) for action authorization (tool, target, params, identity, purpose); **Intent/Context** (PIC/CSC) for action-time payload screening and unsafe content; **Network controls** (where applicable) for egress/segmentation enforcement	Tool-call ledger (tool, method, target, parameters); allow/deny/restrict decision + rationale; parameter validation/sanitization actions; environment binding (prod/dev); tool outputs and post-check results; egress/network logs where applicable
Stop / Continue	Terminate safely when budgets are exceeded, cumulative risk rises, or policy requires escalation. Prevent runaway loops, retry amplification, and unsafe continuation; ensure an auditable end-state.	Primarily **Authority** (policy governance for termination/rollback/escalation); supported by cumulative **Intent/Context/Model** risk accumulation across the loop	Stop reason; budget consumption (steps/time/tools); cumulative risk state; final disposition (completed/aborted/escalated); any rollback/compensation actions; final evidence bundle pointer

Together, this workflow-step mapping operationalizes the four-boundary model in a form that engineering teams can implement directly. Each step has explicit policy decisions to make, and each decision yields a corresponding evidence record. This is the core design goal of WedgeSecure Agent: **continuous trust enforcement with audit-grade proof**, from the first request through every action that changes state.

4.3 Deployment Guidance: Where PDP Microservices Run (Edge Economics and Acceleration)

The trust gates defined in Section 4 are implemented by PDP microservices that must make decisions in the critical path of agentic workflows. In many deployments, these decisions require LLM inference (for example, semantic injection detection, policy classification, model routing decisions, and action authorization logic). This raises a practical deployment question: where do these PDP services run, and how can they be deployed economically at the edge?

WedgeSecure Agent supports multiple deployment topologies:

- **Cloud PDP:** suitable for centralized governance and high-throughput environments where GPU acceleration is economical
- **Edge PDP:** suitable for mission-critical edge networks where latency, sovereignty, and operational resilience matter, and where GPU-only deployments may be cost-prohibitive or operationally impractical
- **Hybrid PDP:** common in enterprise settings, with selected decisions performed locally at the edge and others delegated to centralized services based on risk, bandwidth, and latency constraints

For edge deployments, WedgeSecure Agent is designed to run its decision microservices on cost-effective, widely available compute. Rather than assuming GPUs are always present, the platform supports CPU-accelerated inference pipelines that can deliver practical latency and throughput using optimized runtime stacks. In particular, OpenVINO-class inference optimization on capable CPUs enables efficient deployments for security decisioning workloads, including INT8 quantization and hardware-aware execution, reducing cost per decision while preserving the deterministic enforcement posture required in high-stakes networks.

This capability is strategically important because many “best-effort” guardrails in today’s frameworks rely on static rules (for example, regex-style content checks), which are insufficient against semantic prompt injection and multi-step manipulation. By enabling semantic, model-based PDP decisioning on edge-friendly compute, WedgeSecure Agent makes enterprise-grade policy decisioning deployable not only in cloud data centers, but also across distributed edge environments where cost, power, and operational simplicity are decisive constraints.

As a result, the PDP layer can be placed where it provides the most value (cloud, edge, or hybrid), while preserving continuous trust enforcement and audit-grade evidence generation across the agentic workflow.

5. Integrating With Agent Frameworks



Figure 12 Integrating with Agent Frameworks

WedgeSecure Agent is designed to integrate into existing agent frameworks rather than replace them. Most teams build agentic applications using LangChain [5], NeMo Guardrails [4], or custom orchestrators because these frameworks provide the workflow engine: prompt templating, tool calling, memory/RAG, state management, and retry/stop logic. They also provide practical interception points such as input/output hooks, tool-call wrappers, and routing middleware.

However, framework-level guardrails are primarily developer-oriented, best effort controls. They can be probabilistic, configuration-sensitive, and unevenly enforced across heterogeneous tools and model endpoints. More importantly, they do not typically operate as centralized policy decision services that consistently emit audit-grade evidence across the full workflow.

WedgeSecure Agent adds that missing enterprise layer: policy decision microservices that are consistent across models, tools, and environments, and that return both an enforceable decision and an evidence bundle suitable for compliance reporting, incident response, and continuous improvement.

5.1 Integration Pattern: PDP Microservices With Framework Enforcement

As shown in Figure 12, the agent framework remains the execution engine and enforcement point, while WedgeSecure Agent provides centralized policy decisions:

- The framework calls security decision APIs at the same checkpoints it already intercepts execution (pre-run input, post-RAG context assembly, pre-model routing, pre-tool invocation, post-tool output)
- WedgeSecure Agent returns structured decisions plus evidence bundles, enabling deterministic enforcement and consistent logs across steps, workloads, and environments

WedgeSecure Agent exposes four core PDP APIs:

- **PIC API**: returns a prompt/context risk score and rationale (e.g., instruction override, indirect injection, goal hijack signals)
- **CSC API**: returns content classification labels and severity for both inbound context and outbound content
- **MRDB API**: returns a model selection decision plus constraints, enforcing policy on model identity, version, endpoint, and routing rules (including required security strength for task and data sensitivity)
- **AAL API**: returns an authorization verdict for autonomous actions: authorize (tool, target, params, identity, purpose) with scope, delegation, and environment checks.

5.2 What the Framework Enforces Using WedgeSecure Agent Decisions

Because the framework owns execution, it applies PDP outputs at runtime. Typical enforcement actions include:

- Allow / deny / restrict tool invocation
- Select a model and endpoint that meet the required security strength for the task and data class (including version and routing constraints)
- Require step-up approval for high-risk actions
- Redact, transform, or block unsafe or regulated content
- Terminate, quarantine, or escalate when risk accumulates

This division of responsibility is intentional: WedgeSecure Agent is a standards-aligned **PDP layer**, while agent frameworks (and, where applicable, existing gateways and network controls) act as **PEPs**. The result is minimal disruption to application architecture: teams keep their preferred

framework and toolchain while gaining centralized policy governance, consistent enforcement semantics, and audit-grade evidence.

5.3 Practical Integration Checkpoints

In most implementations, teams start with five checkpoints that map directly to the agentic workflow:

1. **Input admission**: call PIC/CSC and bind identity and scope via AAL
2. **Post-retrieval context assembly**: call CSC (and AAL if access to sensitive sources requires explicit authorization)
3. **Model routing**: consult MRDB (and optionally AAL for endpoint authorization)
4. **Pre-action gating**: call AAL for each tool invocation; apply PIC/CSC to high-risk payloads and tool outputs
5. **Stop/continue governance**: enforce budgets, escalation rules, and cumulative risk triggers using returned decisions and evidence

These checkpoints provide immediate control coverage while allowing teams to incrementally adopt deeper instrumentation and richer evidence capture over time.

5.4 WedgeSecure Agent Release Roadmap

WedgeSecure Agent is an innovative new product offering from Wedge Networks, developed to help organizations operationalize agentic AI with enterprise-grade security and auditability. In parallel with core R and D, we are actively working with piloting partners to validate real-world integration patterns and ensure that partner-built, in-house agentic applications can meet high assurance requirements that go beyond the default guardrails available in today's agent frameworks. The goal is not to replace those frameworks, but to augment them with standards-aligned policy decision microservices and evidence generation that are consistent across models, tools, and environments.

Planned module availability (subject to pilot feedback and iterative hardening):

- **Q1 2026: NSP (Network Security Platform)**
  Building on Wedge Network's proven network security stack, NSP delivers deep content inspection driven, real-time security policy decisions and enforcement for agentic workflows, including network-level controls that reduce exposure during tool access and external connectivity
- **Q2 to Q3 2026: MRDB (Model Trust and Routing Database)**
  MRDB enables secure model routing and governance by providing policy-driven model selection constraints and trust posture signals (model identity, versioning, endpoint controls, robustness and risk scores), designed to integrate cleanly with standard LLM router patterns

- **Q3 to Q4 2026: PIC, CSC, and AAL**
  The remaining PDP microservices expand end-to-end protection across trust boundaries: PIC for semantic prompt and context injection detection, CSC for orchestrated content safety classification, and AAL for continuous authentication and authorization of autonomous actions (identity, delegation, scope, and environment integrity), including audit-grade decision evidence

Conclusion

Agentic AI is the next major step in digital transformation because it can reason, plan, and act across real systems, not just generate content. But the same autonomy that drives productivity also raises the bar for governance: once an agent can call tools, touch sensitive data, and mutate system state, “best-effort guardrails” are no longer enough. In high-stakes environments like finance, healthcare, government, and any workflow with sensitive data or operational control, trust becomes the deployment ceiling**.**

WedgeSecure Agent is built for that ceiling. It is a PDP-first microservices platform that secures the Agentic Edge by turning policy into consistent, enforceable decisions plus audit-grade evidence across the full workflow:

- **Agent Intent (PIC)** preserves instruction integrity across multi-step execution and detects semantic conflict and goal hijacking
- **Agent Context (CSC)** provides unified content safety and compliance classification for both inbound context and outbound outputs
- **Agent Model (MRDB)** governs model trust and routing so each task uses a model and endpoint that meets required security strength
- **Agent Authority (AAL)** continuously authorizes autonomous actions by binding identity, delegation, scope, target, and runtime integrity

Together, these pillars operationalize next-generation intelligent zero trust as a repeatable control plane for agentic systems, enabling organizations to adopt autonomy without losing control, accountability, or auditability.

If you are building or deploying agentic AI and security, compliance, or audit-readiness is a requirement, we would like to work with you. We are engaging pilot partners to validate real-world integrations and evidence requirements; reach out to discuss a joint evaluation, a threat-model review of your workflow, or a limited-scope pilot aligned to your environment and risk profile.

Acknowledgements

Wedge Networks gratefully acknowledges the research contributions and ongoing collaboration of Dr. Majid Ghaderi (University of Calgary), Dr. Di Niu (University of Alberta), and Dr. Burak Kantarci (University of Ottawa), and their respective world-class research teams. We also acknowledge the support of NSERC and Mitacs. In addition, we thank the Eureka SUSTAINET program for providing the strategic, high-impact use cases and piloting opportunities across mission-critical service infrastructures and enterprise environments that helped shape and validate this work.

References

1. McKinsey & Company, “The agentic organization: Contours of the next paradigm for the AI era,” Sep 26, 2025.
2. BCG, “How Agentic AI is Transforming Enterprise Platforms,” Oct 13, 2025. (BCG Global)
3. Simon Willison, “The lethal trifecta for AI agents,” Jun 16, 2025. (Simon Willison’s Weblog)
4. NVIDIA NeMo Guardrails, documentation and repository, (GitHub)
5. LangChain, guardrails documentation, (LangChain Docs)
6. NVIDIA, “LLM Router” (https://build.nvidia.com/nvidia/llm-router)
7. MISP Project, documentation (https://misp-project.org).
8. Cloud Security Alliance, “Securing Autonomous AI Agents,” Jan 29, 2026.